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COMMENTS
STOCK TRANSFER RESTRICTIONS AND THE
CLOSE CORPORATION-A STATUTORY
PROPOSAL
By Gn.ERT N. KRUGER*
INTRODUCTION-THE CLOSE CORPORATION
THE importance of the closely held corporation (also known as the
family corporation and the "incorporated partnership") seems to
have been obscured by the shadow of its big brother, the publicly
held corporation. Although the earliest corporations were in reality
"incorporated partnerships," formed to attain limited liability for the
incorporators, it was the growth in stature of the larger, publicly held
corporations at which legislation was directed.1 It was only natural
that statutes were designed to protect the investing public as the gap
between ownership and management in publicly held corporations
grew wider.
Unfortunately however,
Statutes and judicial decisions, in laying down rules for the gov-
ernance of corporations, have not distinguished between public issue
and close corporations. As the nature and methods of operations
of publicly held and closely held corporations are utterly different,
the result has been that many of the concepts and principles of
corporate law (undoubtedly developed with public issue corpora-
tions primarily in mind) are ill-adapted to closely held enterprises.
In Great Britain and the countries of continental Europe, "private"
companies are governed by special legislative rules; but in this
country, as a general proposition, the same rules are applied to all
corporations mdiscrmnnately 2
The close corporation is a highly desirable business form which
has achieved widespread existence despite the comparative matten-
tion paid to it by legislatures and courts. It is largely due to the inge-
nuity of the corporate attorney that the close corporation has devel-
oped and gamed acceptance. 3 Although divergent approaches have
*Member, Third Year Class.
SO'NeaL Foreword to Note, A Plea for Separate Statutory Treatment of the Close




been used in attempts to define a close corporation, the singular intent
has been to differentiate it from the publicly held corporation.4
Although there are several distinguishing features of importance,
two are most significant. A close corporation is generally character-
ized by identity of ownership and management, as the shareholders
have a direct hand in corporate admimstration. In the publicly held
corporation, on the other hand, the shareholders have practically
nothing to do with the management of corporate affairs. Management
is left to the board of directors, which is elected by the shareholders
for this purpose. Additionally, since the "partners" work intimately
in the daily operation of the business, they must be free to choose
their own associates. It is a necessity in the close corporation that
the parties mold themselves into a cohesive work group. Shares in
the publicly held corporation must be freely transferable because
they are sold to the investing public. This requirement of free trans-
ferability naturally eliminates the possibility of selecting one's co-
owners in the publicly-held corporation. There would seem to be no
good reason why the shareholders of the publicly held corporation
would want to choose their co-shareholders, while in the close cor-
poration the opportunity to choose is essential.
The striking resemblance between a partnership and a close cor-
poration is the source of the phrase "incorporated partnership." The
close corporation is a business form in which the participants act
towards each other as if they were partners, while adopting the cor-
porate form to obtain its advantages. Once this corporate form has
been established the conduct of the associates between themselves,
as distinguished from what the business entity looks like to third par-
ties and the state, is what really concerns the "partners." Their desire
is to have the close corporation remain close.5 Restricting the avail-
ability of shares to outsiders is the most effective way to retain this
closeness.
Use of the stock transfer restriction in the close corporation is
4 Winer, Proposing a New York "Close Corporation Law," 28 CORNELL L.Q. 313
(1943), suggests that a close corporation be defined as one with one to five ultimate
shareholders; The English Companies Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 28(1)(b),
defines a "private" company (close corporation) as one which 'limits the number of
its members to fifty ", Under the INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1371(a)(1), "a
small business corporation" is defined as one "which does not have more than 10
shareholders."
5 An early and classic statement to this effect is one by Holmes in Barrett v. King,
181 Mass. 476, 479, 63 N.E. 934, 935 (1902)- "Stock in a corporation is not merely
property. It also creates a personal relation analogous otherwise than technically to a
partnership. [T]here seems to be no greater objection to retaining the right of
choosing one's associates in a corporation than in a firm."
6 A partial bibliography of materials dealing with stock transfer restrictions and
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indispensable for insuring continued closeness. It is the purpose of
this comment to examine the stock transfer restriction in light of its
importance to the close corporation, and to indicate the need for
legislative attention to the difficulties attorneys and courts encounter
in working with stock transfer restrictions under present statutes and
precedents.
That the subject is of more than academic interest is underscored
by the fact that there are at present in excess of 18,000 new corporate
filings each year in California alone.7 Although separate figures for
close corporations are not available it is highly probable that the great
majority of filings are for closely held corporations. 8
THE STOCK TRANSFER RESTRICTION IN RELATION
TO THE CLOSE CORPORATION
Stock transfer restrictions have been aptly referred to as "a sort of
pre-emptive right." Most commonly, either the existing stockholders
or the corporation or both in succession are given the first opportunity
to purchase the shares offered by a selling shareholder. The effect of
this first option or right of first purchase is to give the existing share-
holders the power to "veto the admission of a new participant."10
close corporations includes: 1 HoNsTmN, CoRsonxoN LAw Aim PRACTCE §§ 191-210
(1959); 2 O'NEA., CLOSE ConwoRa'xoNs 2-80 (1958); Cataldo, Stock Transfer
Restrictions and Closed Corporations, 37 VA. L. tnv. 229 (1951); Cower, Some
Contrasts Between British and American Corporation Law, 69 HAmv. L. Rnv. 1369
(1956); Hornstem, Judicial Tolerance of the Incorporated Partnership, 18 LAw &
Corrmax. PRoB. 435 (1953); Hornstem, Stockholders' Agreements in the Closely Held
Corporation, 59 YALE L.J. 1040 (1950); Israels, The Close Corporation and the Law, 33
CORNELL L.Q. 488 (1948); O'Neal, Developments in the Regulation of the Close
Corporation, 50 CoRNELL L.Q. 641 (1965); O'Neal, Restrictions on Transfer of Stock
in Closely Held Corporations: Planning and Drafting, 65 H-Rv. L. tEv. 773 (1952);
Oppenhem, The Close Corporation in California-Necessity of Separate Treatment, 12
HAs=rns L.J. 227 (1961); Painter, Stock Transfer Restrictions: Continuing Uncertainties
and a Legislative Proposal, 6 VmL. L. REv. 48 (1960); Winer, Proposing a New York
Close Corporation Law, 28 CoRnNrz L.Q. 313 (1948); Annot., 2 A.L.R.2d 745 (1948);
Annot., 61 A.L.R.2d 1318 (1958).
7 Letter from Ralph R. Martig, Semor Counsel and Deputy, Office of the
Califorma Secretary of State, to the Hastings Law Journal, December 10, 1965.
8 See Dykstra, Molding the Utah Corporation: Survey and Commentary, 7 UTwa
L. REv. 1 (1960): "[Tlhe author undertook a study of fifty corporation charters to
ascertain the drafting practices followed by lawyers m respect to such documents. While
these charters were ified on behalf of Utah corporations, there is no reason to suppose
that they are umque. In appraising these observations, it is unportant to note that
forty-two of the articles of incorporation were apparently drafted for small closely-held
enterprises."
9 Allen v. Biltmore Tissue Corp., 2 N.Y.2d 534, 543, 141 N.E.2d 812, 816, 161
N.Y.S.2d 418, 424 (1957).
10 Ibid.
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Such a restriction can be placed m the bylaws,"' the articles of mcor-
poration,' s or a shareholders' agreement. 3
Although the phrase "preemptive right" is associated in corpora-
tion law with the right of shareholders to have the first opportunity
to buy new stock issued by the corporation, exercising rights under
a stock transfer restriction is also a preemptive right. In the close cor-
poration the right of first purchase is given to the corporation or the
shareholders or both m succession and generally applies to shares
which have already been issued. In the publicly held corporation, the
preemptive right (where it exists) invariably extends to new issues of
shares and runs only to the existing shareholders.' 4 Putting these dis-
tinctions aside, it is clear that rights created by the stock transfer
restriction are preemptive rights.' 5
Not all stock transfer restrictions are valid. The earliest cases con-
cerning transfer restrictions in the United States held them invalid.16
The theory was that a share of stock is a property right and the re-
striction amounts to an unreasonable restraint on the alienation of
property 17 On the other hand, 'English law has always regarded
shares of stock as creatures of the company's constitution and there-
fore as essentially contractual choses in action," 18 not subject to the
rules against restraints on alienation.
The present test for validity of a stock transfer restriction is
whether it is reasonable. It cannot amount to a total prohibition
against transfer because of the rule against restraints. Additionally,
many courts hold unreasonable, on public policy grounds, stock trans-
fer restrictions which give the present shareholders or the board of
directors the power to veto the admittance of a new shareholder.' 9
1 Tu-Vu Drive-In Corp. v. Ashkms, 61 Cal. 2d 283, 38 Cal. Rptr. 348, 391 P.2d
828 (1964).
12 Monacan Hills v. Page, 203 Va. 110, 122 S.E.2d 654 (1961).
13 Guaranty Laundry Co. v. Pulliam, 198 Okla. 667, 181 P.2d 1007 (1947).
1 4
LATTn, ConPonrnoNs 424 (1959).
15 According to Blackstone, the King "had the profitable prerogative of purveyance
and pre-emption: which was a right enjoyed by the crown of buying up provisions and
other necessaries, by the intervention of the king's purveyors, for the use of his royal
household, at an appraised valuation, in preference to all others, and even without
consent of the owner " 1 JoNm' Br.cxsToNE 418 (1915).
16Victor J. Bloede Co. v. Bloede, 84 Md. 129, 34 Aft. 1127 (1896); Bunkerhoff-
Farris Trust & Sav. Co. v. Home Lumber Co., 118 Mo. 447, 24 S.W 129 (1893);
Ireland v. Globe Milling Co., 21 R.I. 9, 41 At. 258 (1898).
17 Tracey v. Franklin, 31 Del. Ch. 477, 67 A.2d 56 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
18 Gower, Some Contrasts Between British and American Corporation Law, 69
HAv. L. REv. 1369, 1377 (1956).
19 The American courts have been in conflict on this point, although the later cases
seem to sustain the validity of these "consent restraints." See O'Neal, Restrictions on
the Transfer of Stock in Closely Held Corporations: Planning and Drafting, 65 HAnv.
L. REv. 773, 780 (1952).
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There is no doubt that today in the United States reasonable stock
transfer restrictions (such as rights of first purchase held by the cor-
poration or the shareholders or both) are almost everywhere held
valid.20 Now that the validity of reasonable restrictions has become
firmly entrenched, recent cases indicate a shift of emphasis. Present
attention seems to be focusing on a determination as to whether
amendments to bylaws or articles of incorporation, either adopting
restrictions for the first time or eliminating those already included,
are valid. 1 A second broad area of difficulty is one that has been pre-
sent from the beginning-judicial interpretation of the language used
in creating the restrictions. The material to follow will analyze each of
these problem areas in trn, and a statutory solution will be suggested.
ADDING OR DELETING STOCK TRANSFER
RESTRICTIONS BY AMENDMENT
An examination of some recent cases, principally cases from Cali-
fornia, will illustrate the difficulty of adding or deleting stock transfer
restrictions by amendment of the bylaws or articles.
Casady v. Modern Metal Spinning & Mfg Co.22 involved a close
corporation whose bylaws contained a typical right of first purchase.
Plaintiff had brought a divorce proceeding against her husband, who
owned one half of the corporate stock. A property settlement agree-
ment declared that plaintiff should be entitled to one half of the
shares held by the husband. The corporation refused to issue the
shares to plaintiff, pointing to the stock transfer restriction in the
bylaws. The district court of appeal refused plaintiff's request for a
court order to force a meeting of the board of directors for the pur-
pose of voting to delete the restriction. The court relied on an earlier
line of cases23 winch also refused amendments of the bylaws even
though a statute 4 explicitly permits amendment. The rationale was
that some bylaws create contractual rights which cannot be destroyed
without the consent of all the parties to the agreement.25
In Silva v. Coastal Plywood & Timber Co.2 6 the articles of incor-
20 Id. at 780-81.
2 1 See, e.g., Tu-Vu Dnve-In Corp. v. Ashkms, 61 Cal. 2d 283, 38 Cal. Rptr. 348,
391 P.2d 828 (1964); Casady v. Modem Metal Spinning & Mfg. Co., 188 Cal. App. 2d
728, 10 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1961); Silva v. Coastal Plywood & Timber Co., 124 Cal. App. 2d
276, 268 P.2d 510 (1954); Bechtold v. Coleman Realty Co., 367 Pa. 208, 79 A.2d 661
(1951); Sandor Petroleum Corp. v. Williams, 321 S.W.2d 614 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959).
22 188 Cal. App. 2d 728, 10 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1961).
2 3 Bennett v. Hiberia Bank, 47 Cal. 2d 540, 305 P.2d 20 (1956); State v. San
Francisco Say. Etc. Soc., 66 Cal. App. 53, 225 Pao. 309 (1924); Bornstein v. District
Grand Lodge No. 4, 2 Cal. App. 624, 84 Pac. 271 (1906).
24 CAL. Conp. CODE § 501(g).
25 188 Cal. App. 2d 728, 734, 10 Cal. Rptr. 790, 794 (1961).
26 124 Cal. App. 2d 276, 268 P.2d 510 (1954).
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poration provided that only one share of stock could be issued to or
owned by any stockholder. The corporation had financial difficulties
and filed for reorgamzation under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act.27
Plaintiffs, the minority shareholders, sought an injunction against pro-
posed majority-shareholder action eliminating the restrictions. The
corporation was organized under the laws of Nevada. The district
court of appeal upheld the majority's action in amending the articles
to eliminate the restriction. Under the Nevada statute, which is to the
same effect as that of California, amendments to the articles are per-
mitted.2 8 Since the amendment fell within the scope of the statute it
was held valid, notwithstanding the minority's clai that they had a
vested contractual right in retaining the restriction.2 9
As stated by the court in Tu-Vu Drtve-In Corp. v. Ashkrns,30 "This
case presents the issue of whether a corporation may enforce a bylaw
restricting the alienation of stock against a non-consenting shareholder
who acquired his stock prior to the enactment of the bylaw "3 ' Neither
the original articles nor bylaws contained any stock transfer restric-
tions. The supreme court upheld the action of the board of directors
in amending the bylaws to include a restriction after the minority
shareholder, defendant in this declaratory judgment action, had at-
tempted to sell the shares to a business competitor. The court based
its decision on two sections of the California Corporations Code.
Section 500 permits amendments of the bylaws32 and section 5 01(g)
permits "reasonable restraints upon the right to transfer or hypothe-
cate shares" in the bylaws.38 Most of the opinion was devoted to deter-
mining whether the restriction was "reasonable" as required by sec-
tion 501(g) A two-pronged test was set forth: first, whether the
restriction would be a prohibitive restraint on the right of alienation
and second, whether the restriction would "unreasonably deprive the
shareholder of 'substantial rights.'-34 Both tests were resolved in
27 52 Stat. 883 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 501-676 (1964).
28 NE v. REv. STAT. § 78.385(1) (c) (1957) provides that a corporation may amend
its articles of incorporation by "increasing, decreasing or reclassifying its authorized
capital stock by changing the number, par value, designations, preferences or the
qualifications, limitations or restrictions of its shares
29 Silva v. Coastal Plywood & Timber Co., 124 Cal. App. 2d 276, 279, 268 P.2d
510, 512 (1954).
30 61 Cal. 2d 283, 38 Cal. Rptr. 348, 391 P.2d 828 (1964), noted, 53 CALI. L.
REv. 692 (1964).
31 Id. at 284, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 349, 319 P.2d at 829.
3 2 CAL. Cor,. CODE § 500 provides in part: "By-laws may be adopted, amended
or repealed by the vote or the written assent of shareholders entitled to exercise a
majority of the voting power of the corporation.
33 CAL. CoRn,. CoDE § 501 provides: "The by-laws of a corporation may make
provisions not in conflict with law or its articles for: (g) Special qualifications of
persons who may be shareholders, and reasonable restrictions on the right to transfer or
hypothecate shares."
34 61 Cal. 2d at 286, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 350, 391 P.2d at 830 (1964).
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favor of the action which had been taken by the board of directors-
the first because a right of first purchase is not "unreasonably restric-
tive"35 and the second because the purpose or benefit to the corpora-
tion (preventing the sale of shares to a business competitor) out-
weighed the impairment of the rights of the complaining shareholder
to hold his shares free of the restriction .
3
Each of these cases involved a determination as to whether, at a
date subsequent to incorporation, the bylaws or articles could be
amended either to delete or add stock transfer restrictions. It has
been found difficult to reconcile the opinions in these decisions. As a
matter of generalization it seems safe to say that the Califorma courts
have attempted to reach desirable results by choosing from among
several available approaches, none of which is directly applicable. 7
In Casady, the court refused to order the deletion of the stock
transfer restriction from the bylaws, apparently feeling no compelling
need to disrupt the corporate structure in order to satisfy the terms
of a property settlement agreement. The court emphasized the con-
tractual nature of stock transfer restrictions. Where an amendment of
articles to eliminate a stock transfer restriction was necessary to ef-
fectuate a program of corporate reorgamzation, as in Silva, the court
upheld the deleting amendment. Here reliance was placed on statutory
language permitting amendment of the articles. In Tu-Vu, the court
upheld an amendment of the bylaws creating a stock transfer restric-
tion not found in the original bylaws. In so doing, it forestalled a po-
tential transfer of a minority shareholder's interest to a business com-
petitor. Here, as in Silva, stress was put on the language of the statute
permitting amendment.
It is interesting to note that the court in Casady failed to cite the
Silva case, while the court in Tu-Vu relied on Silva, but omitted any
reference to Casady. It would appear that these cases were all similar
enough to merit at least a distinguishing discussion.
In the light of the Tu-Vu decision, would the Califorma Supreme
Court reach the same result where the bylaw amendment induced by
the majority shareholder was designed to prevent a transfer of shares
to a fellow shareholder rather than a business competitor? The court
in Tu-Vu stated that
Bylaws restricting transfer in closed corporations are frequently
essential to a successful enterprise; they perform an important func-
tion in precluding unwanted intrusions by outsiders; they preserve
the integrity of the functionmg entity Such bylaws are "necessary
85 Ibid.
35 Id. at 287, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 350, 391 '.2d at 830. Contra, Sandor Petroleum
Corp. v. Williams, 321 S.W.2d 614 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959).
37 CAL. CoPX. CODE § 501(g) provides that stock transfer restrictions may appear
in the bylaws, but there is no specific indication that they may be adopted by
amendment at a date subsequent to incorporation.
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for the protection of the corporation and its stockholders against
rivals in business or others who might purchase its shares for the pur-
pose of acquiring information which might thereafter by used against
the interest of the company "38
A court faced with this variation of the Tu-Vu situation would have
to decide whether a transfer to another stockholder, rather than a
business competitor (as in Tu-Vu), was sufficiently harmful to the
corporation to justify the bylaw amendment. Such a determination
might present a difficult factual problem for the court. An alternative
approach would be to hold the bylaw amendment sanctioned by
statute and dispense with the case on this ground, as was done in
Silva and Tu-Vu.
A second modification of the Tu-Vu fact pattern would appear to
present an even greater potential problem. In Bechtold v. Coleman
Realty Co.3 9 the court was faced with the question of determining
whether a majority shareholder could induce an amendment to the
bylaws which would delete a stock transfer restriction. The majority
shareholder's purpose in doing this was to sell to an outsider who was
not a business competitor of the corporation. The court m Bechtold
divided corporate bylaws into two classes, (a) those that are merely
regulatory and (b) those that are in the nature of a contract which
vests property rights in all the shareholders. 40 The stock transfer re-
striction was placed m the second class, thereby preventing its dele-
tion without the consent of all the other stockholders whose rights
were affected 41 Would the Califorma supreme court reach the same
result? It will be remembered that in Silva the court upheld an amend-
ment of the articles eliminating a stock transfer restriction because
such an amendment was sanctioned by statute as a regulatory matter.
Although that decision would be good case law precedent for the same
result here, it is doubtful whether the Califorma supreme court would
follow the rationale of Silva in this situation. In Silva the corporation
was reorganizing under the Bankruptcy Act and it was essential that
new stockholders with fresh capital be admitted. No corresponding
need is present under these facts.
A possible basis for rejecting the amendment deleting the restric-
tion would be to hold, as did Bechtold, that the minority shareholders
had a contractual or "vested" right to hold their shares with the restric-
tion intact. The district court of appeal upheld the minority share-
holder's "vested right" contention in Tu-Vu.42 The California supreme
38 61 Cal. 2d at 287, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 350, 391 P.2d at 830. (Emphasis added.)
39 367 Pa. 208, 79 A.2d 661 (1951). Accord, Cowles v. Cowles Realty Co., 201 App.
Div. 460, 194 N.Y.S. 546 (1922).
40 367 Pa. at 213, 79 A.2d at 663 (1951).
41 Tbd.
42The trial court found that the minority shareholder had a vested right to hold
[VoL. 17THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
court reversed the district court of appeal, holding that "The share-
holder thus acquires his shares subject to the power of the corpora-
tion to alter its contract with hzm pursuant to statutory authority 4 s
This broad statement rejecting the argument that certain bylaws
create contractual rights would apparently foreclose the supreme
court from protecting the minority shareholders on this basis, should
the Bechtold case arise in California.
The court's strongest position in refusing the proposed amend-
ment ught be to hold that the majority shareholder owes a fiduciary
duty to the minority shareholders. The ivocation of this equitable
prmciple in many analogous cases represents a growing trend in cor-
poration law44 Using tis approach, the court would look to the good
faith of the majority shareholder and could set aside the attempted
elimination of the stock transfer restriction on the basis of a finding
of unfair dealing for personal gain. "But fraud and fair dealing are
unfortunately not self-explanatory; even sensitive consciences will
vary in their reaction to a given situation."45 In other words, here too
the court would be faced with a difficult factual determination.
The element common to each of the above fact situations was the
absence of statutory language which definitively dealt with all of the
facts. The courts were forced to deal with corporation statutes satis-
factory for handling ordinary amendments of bylaws or articles but
entirely inadequate in coping with the particular problem of amend-
ments concering stock transfer restrictions. One might ask at tis
point, in light of the importance of stock transfer restrictions, why
statutes bearing on the problem have not been enacted. The answer
simply is that this phase of corporation law is in its rudimentary stage.
It has only been in the last twenty years or so that the close cor-
porations plight has been noticed to any appreciable extent in the
United States.46 The initiative was taken by scholars who brought the
problem to light with the intention of effecting corrective legislation.4r
They must be given credit for some of the recent enactments aimed
at aiding the close corporation. Suggested drafts of comprehensive
close corporation statutes, however, have usually been rejected be-
her shares free of the restriction mposed by the amended bylaws. This position was
upheld by the district court of appeal m Tu-Vu Dnve-In Corp. v. Ashkins, 34 Cal.
Rptr. 622 (1963).
4
3 Tu-Vu Drive-In Corp. v. Ashkins, 61 Cal. 2d 283, 288, 38 Cal. Rptr. 348, 351,
391 P.2d 828, 831 (1964). (Emphasis added.)
4 4 See, e.g., Schwab v. Schwab-Wilson Mach. Corp., 13 Cal. App. 2d 1, 55 P.2d
1268 (1936); LATri, CoponATIoNs 267-72, 511-15.
45 Frey, Shareholder's Pre-Emptive Rights, 38 YAxE L.J. 563, 583 (1929).
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cause of a single factor-the perplexing problem of defining a close
corporation .4  North Carolina has met this difficulty by defining a
close corporation as being one whose shares are not "generally traded
in the markets maintained by securities dealers or brokers "49
Florida has followed suit,50 but the rest of the states have not, prob-
ably because they are not convinced that this approach is satisfactory
It is submitted that an alternative approach to the problem of
amendments of bylaws or articles affecting stock transfer restrictions
is possible. As is the case in other situations where piecemeal legis-
lation has been directed at the close corporation, it is feasible to word
a statute so that only a close corporation could avail itself of its terms.5
Thus, a statute could be drawn whose language simply states that
if those formig a corporation desire stock transfer restrictions as part
of the corporate form, they must provide for the restrictions m the
articles of incorporation. 2 The proposed statute would state that only
restrictions found in the articles, either as originally drawn or as
amended, will be valid. If a corporation desires to make use of the
stock transfer restriction, it must do so by following the statute's
directions. Provisions for stock transfer restrictions in any other man-
ner will not suffice. It should be stressed that choosing to include
stock transfer restrictions is a completely elective process. Obviously,
only a close corporation could (or would) avail itself of this procedure.
Yet a close corporation never has to be defined. Those states which
have sympathized with the close corporations' predicament, but have
not taken action because of the definitional problem, could readily
adopt the proposed statute.
The above discussion indicates that a uniform method of adopting
48 The New York Law Revision -Commssion debated the matter of defining a close
corporation for the purpose of enacting a close corporation law but decided against
such a measure. As stated in the report, "no satisfactory way of defining the genuine
close corporation for purposes of a statute has been found. Economcally, the distinction
between a close corporation and any other is that in the close corporation management
and ownership are substantially identical, but the only way in which it appeared to
the Commission that a definition could be embodied in a statute would be to limit the
amendment to corporations having not more than a stated number of shareholders, or
not more than a stated amount of capital. This would necessarily be arbitrary, might
not provide an answer to the economic problem, and would possibly permit a single
shareholder by splitting up of his shareholding to break up the arrangement at will
unless the remaining shareholders or the corporation bought him out." 1948 N.Y. LAw
REvlsION Comi2X'N Rsa'. 386 (1948).
49 N.C. Gm. STAT. § 55-73(b) (1965).
50 FLA. STAT. § 608.0100(2) (1963).
51 See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. Corp. LAw § 616, growing out of the famous case of
Benmtendi v. Kenton Hotel, 294 N.Y. 112, 60 N.E.2d 829 (1945), and CAL. CoRP. CODE
§ 500, which allow the incorporators to provide for more than a bare majority vote
to transact corporate business.
52 See Appendix for § 1 of the proposed statute.
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and eliminating stock transfer restrictions is needed. Corporate at-
torneys drafting stock transfer restrictions are entitled to know before-
hand, with some degree of certainty, the basis on which the courts
will ]udge the restrictions. Courts, on the other hand, need explicit
statutory guidance. Applying this principle to the cases discussed,
the court would merely have to determine whether the adoption or
elimination of the stock transfer restriction complied with the pro-
posed statute's instructions.
5 3
There is no magic in including stock transfer restrictions in the
articles of incorporation rather than the bylaws. The desired uniform-
ity could be achieved by inclusion in either place. But greater solem-
nity is generally required to amend the articles and the proposed
statute would properly take advantage of this requirement. 4 Since
maintaining the closeness of the close corporation is a major premise
upon which the corporation is formed, the articles, either as originally
drawn or as amended, should reflect this intention.
Another section of the proposed statute indicates the method by
which an amendment of the articles either to include stock transfer
restrictions not found therein originally, or to eliminate restrictions
originally included, shall be made.5 If the corporation is composed of
four or fewer shareholders, a unammous vote of all voting shares
would be required. In a corporation with five or more shareholders, a
two-thirds vote of the voting shares would be required. The number
of shareholders delimiting each group was chosen arbitrarily, but
with a definite intention. If the corporation is really small (four or
fewer shareholders), it closely resembles the typical partnership, and
it is therefore fair to require unammous action to include or eliminate
stock transfer restrictions. When the corporation becomes larger, the
process of unanimous vote becomes unwieldly because the whin
of a single shareholder could block action. Thus the unammous vote
requirement is dropped. But to prevent action by a bare majority (as
was the case in Tu-Vu) a two-thirds vote is necessary 58
Any statute directed at stock transfer restrictions should indicate
what types of restrictions are approved. The proposed statute sanc-
53 Aside from this determination, the court would also have to pass upon the
reasonableness of the restriction. This is to make sure that it does not amount to an
unreasonable restraint on alienation.
54 Usually statutes require filing of amendments to the articles of incorporation.
There is no corresponding rule for amendments to the bylaws. In addition, amending the
articles usually requires action by the board of directors and by the shareholders. Bylaws
may often be amended by the shareholders or the board of directors. Compare CAL.
Coiu'. CODE § 3632 with DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109 (1953).
55 See Appendix for § 1(b) of the proposed statute.
56 See note 51 supra for examples of statutes with analogous more-than-majority
voting requirements.
March, 1966] COMMENTS
tions typical rights of first purchase running to the benefit of the
shareholders or the corporation or both in succession, restrictions
giving the corporation the right to purchase the shares of a share-
holder-employee whose employment is terminated, and restrictions
which give the shareholders the right of first purchase of shares held
by the corporation and subsequently offered for sale.57 The language
of the proposed statute indicates that the restrictions listed are not
intended to be exclusive.
The right of first purchase enjoyed by the corporation or the share-
holders or both in succession is the most commonly used and accepted.
Whether the prospective purchase is occasioned by a shareholder's
fortuitous present intent to sell his shares, or occasioned by a sale
pursuant to his retirement, death, or incapacity to participate in the
business, the purpose to be served by the restriction is the same-to
retain the original closeness and balance of power. In practice the
corporation is usually given the first option to purchase. The practical
effect of this provision is that the remaining stockholders retain their
percentage of control, pay no money personally, and have the stock
retired. If the corporation is unable to make the purchase, the share-
holders are given the second option.
Where the corporation purchases its own shares, two points should
be kept in mind, although they are not dealt with in the proposed
statute. First of all, corporation statutes often provide that a corpora-
tion may purchase its own shares only out of earned surplus.5 8 There
is a strong legislative policy behind this requirement 9 which the pro-
posed statute does not attempt to override. Those drafting stock
transfer restrictions under the proposed statute would find it necessary
to research the other corporations statutes on this point.
The second point is closely akin to the first. It is sometimes pro-
vided by statute that if a corporation desires to purchase its own
shares it must make provision for this in the articles of incorporation.60
Here again, it would be necessary to research the other corporations
statutes to verify the applicable law
The purchase (by the corporation or the shareholders) of the
shares of a shareholder-employee whose employment is terminated
serves ]ust as useful a purpose as that described immediately above.
The associates in the close corporation will usually want to "restrict
employee shareholdings to those currently employed (to protect the
57 See Appendix for § 2 of the proposed statute.
5 8 See, e.g., CAL. CoRP. CODE § 1707(c).
59 "The purchase or redemption of its shares by a corporation constitutes a with-
drawal of assets and should be restricted to some reasonable limits of safety for
the protection of creditors and other shareholders. " LAT=r & JENNwNcs, CASES ON
CoEPonATioNs 1211 (3d ed. 1959). See also CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 1705-08.
60 See, e.g., ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. Cors'. ACT § 5 (1953).
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corporation from disgruntled former employees) ,,oi This desire
has been given effect by the courts and is entitled to legislative sanc-
tion.62
The third approved restriction in the proposed statute is that which
gives the existing shareholders the first opportunity to buy shares
winch the corporation has reacquired and later intends to sell. Since
the sale of shares to outsiders by the corporation is just as destructive
as sales by the shareholders, careful draftsmen will often insert such
a restriction.
A notable exception to these sanctioned stock transfer restrictions
is the "consent restraint." The consent restraint is a method by which
the shareholders or the board of directors are given the power to veto
a proposed transfer of shares to a third party Usually, the restraint
specifies that the veto must be exercised on reasonable grounds. There
are three reasons why the consent restraint was omitted from the pro-
posed statute: (1) There are strong policy arguments against consent
restraints and these arguments have prevailed in many jurisdictions;-"
(2) requiring courts to determine whether the veto was "reasonably"
exercised creates a litigation-breeding situation; (3) a right-of-first-
purchase restriction is all the protection the shareholders need any-
way 6
4
PROBLEMS OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF STOCK
TRANSFER RESTRICTIONS
It is probable that the great majority of cases involving stock
transfer restrictions entail judicial construction of the language used
61 1 HonNsmTn, ConoRAnoN LAw AND PRcs'Tc. 248 (1959).
02 Ibzd.
6 3 The older cases took the position that consent restraints were unreasonable
restraints on the right of alienation of personal property. See, e.g., Morrs v. Hussong
Dyeing Mach. Co., 81 N.J. Eq. 256, 86 Ad. 1026 (Ch. 1913); In re Klaus, 67 Wis. 401,
29 N.W 582 (1886). Most of the recent cases uphold consent restraints, although
their validity is still in doubt in many jurisdictions. See O'Neal, Restrictions on Transfer
of Shares in Closely Held Corporations: Planning and Drafting, 65 HAIv. L. REV. 773,
780 (1952).
04 A right of first purchase is often provided for in situations where a judgment
creditor of a shareholder seeks to levy execution on the shares in satisfaction of the
judgment. This type of restriction was not included in the statute as an example of a
sanctioned restriction even though it is generally held valid. The diMculty involves a
determination of the price to be paid to the judgment creditor to prevent his getting hold
of the shares. It is anticipated that the requisite statutory language would be
cumbersome and, since these restrictions are commonly upheld by the courts when
properly drafted, no real hardships should result from their omission from the proposed
statute. The list of restrictions in the proposed statute Is expressly stated to be
illustrative and not inclusive.
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m creating the restrictions.6 5 The proposed statute attempts to deal
with these problems.
The stock transfer restriction agreement will state the time limit
within which the stockholders or the corporation must elect whether
or not to exercise this right of first purchase. Confusion sometimes
occurs because of the failure to specify the date upon which the period
begins to run. Allen v. Biltmore Tissue Corp.66 illustrates the judicial
approach to this situation. The bylaws provided for a right of first
purchase both during the life of the stockholder and in case of death
as follows: "'Should the option provided for in this section not be
exercised, then, after the lapse of ninety days, the legal representative
may dispose of said stock as he sees fit."'
67
As stated by the court, "the section is patently deficient m omitting
to specify the date upon which the 90-day period is to commence."68
Decedent died on October 25, 1953. In February of 1954 the corpora-
tion was informed of his death. Biltmore's board of directors voted
to exercise the option on March 4, 1954 and notified the executor's
attorney of their action on March 23, 1954, nearly five months after
decedent's death. The court held the corporation acted within the
permitted ninety-day period since it could act only after receiving
notice and this occurred in February, 1954.69
Section 3(a) of the proposed statute70 attempts to anticipate these
situations by providing that the option period begins to run upon the
receipt of written notice. Since small corporations may not ask for
the advice of counsel in all instances, it was considered better not to
burden the transferor with the techicalities of registered or certified
mail. Certainly this latter method is more desirable as providing more
reliable proof, but the proposed statutory procedure should suffice.
Every stock transfer restriction agreement specifies a time limit
within which the right of first purchase must be exercised. The periods
chosen vary according to the individual situation. Section 3 of the
proposed statuter l provides for this factor by enabling the draftsman
to select the limitation suitable to his client's needs. If no period
is provided, the proposed statute sets an outer limit of forty-five days
where the corporation is the potential transferee and thirty days where
the shareholder is in this position. The purpose in choosing two
different periods recognizes the greater amount of tume corporate ac-
65 For a collection of cases dealing with the construction and application of stock
transfer restrictions see Annot., 2 A.L.R.2d 745 (1948).
66 2 N.Y.2d 534, 141 N.E.2d 812, 161 N.Y.S.2d 418 (1957).
67 Id. at 538, 141 N.E.2d at 813, 161 N.Y.S.2d at 419.
68 Id. at 544, 141 N.E.2d at 817, 161 N.Y.S.2d at 424.
69 Id. at 544, 141- N.E.2d at 817, 161 N.Y.S.2d at 425.
70 See Appendix.
71 Ibid.
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tion requires. Since the most common stock transfer restriction pro-
vides for alternative rights of first purchase in the corporation and the
shareholders, section 3(b) of the proposed statute provides for two
statutory periods. 72 If the first potential transferee exercises the pur-
chase right, there is no need for the second period to run. Where the
first potential transferee does not exercise the purchase right, the
second period begins to run the day after the first period expires.
Questions sometimes arise as to who will be bound by the stock
transfer restriction agreement. Where, for example, shares come into
the hands of an executor or pledgee, judicial construction of the
agreement's terms is necessary if the language is not explicit. The
proposed statute assumes that draftsmen always intend that the broad-
est possible scope be given stock transfer restrictions. Section 4 of the
proposed statute makes it clear that, unless provided otherwise, the
stock transfer restriction adheres to every share of stock of the corpora-
tion.73 Whether the shares are in the hands of the shareholders, the
corporation, or third parties, the stock transfer restriction binds the
shares. The broad language is intended to fasten to shares in any
status. Thus treasury shares, authorized but unissued shares, issued
shares, and new issues are all subject to the restrictions.
It is important to note that even under such a statutory provision,
the intent of the incorporators may be defeated unless additional
safeguards are provided. If the corporation has a number of author-
ized but umssued shares, the majority shareholders may be able to
dilute the percentage ownership of the minority by voting to issue
these shares at a time when the minority is not m a financial position
to purchase. The majority may purchase the shares themselves and
thereby increase their percentage ownership at the expense of the
minority Section 4 of the proposed statute would be of no help to the
minority group. The provision states that when authorized but un-
issued shares are subsequently issued, the stock transfer restriction
will attach automatically to these shares-but there is no require-
ment restricting the majority from causing the shares to be issued
at any time it decides is appropriate. In other words, although the
transfer restrictions will attach to these shares there is nothing in the
statute which prevents the majority from effectively insuring, by tak-
ing advantage of economic circumstances and its voting power, that
these shares go only to majority shareholders. 74
To protect against issuance of shares which would alter corporate
control, the draftsman should give the shareholders an opportunity to
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid.
7 4 Here, too, the court might hold the majority shareholders to a fiduciary duty to
the minority.
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reject the issuance of previously authorized, but as yet unissued,
shares. This could be accomplished by a provision in the articles of
incorporation which requires, perhaps, a two-thirds vote for approval
of the issuance.75 Since treasury shares can also be sold to outsiders,
the same procedure would be applicable here.
Another way for the majority shareholders to disrupt the original
balance of power would be to authorize a new issue of shares. As
the judge-made equitable doctrine of shareholders preemptive rights
evolved, the existing shareholders had a preemptive right to purchase
any new issue of shares on a pro rata basis, and, therefore, under this
rule there would be no difficulty 76 There is a dangerous pitfall in
Califorma, however, because under the Corporations Code there are
no preemptive rights unless provided for in the articles of incorpora-
tion.77 Thus, as in the case of authorized but umssued shares, the
majority could dilute the minority's interest by authorizing the new
issue at a time which is financially inconvement for the minority 7 1
To carry out the associates' intent, two provisions should be made in
the articles: (1) by analogy to the authorized-but-umssued situation,
the shareholders should be given the opportunity to vote down a pro-
posed new issue and (2) the existing shareholders should be given
a preemptive right to purchase newly issued shares.
One of the main objectives of the proposed statute is to have the
stock transfer restriction become a part of every share of stock of the
close corporation. This objective is designed to help achieve the ulti-
mate goals of keeping the close corporation close and maintaining the
balance of power. The corporate draftsman should take complementary
action by protecting against the foreseeable problems of authorized
but unissued shares, treasury shares, and new issues.
It has already been indicated that maintaining the original balance
of power is often as inportant to the associates as preventing mtru-
sions by outsiders. This objective attained by a clause which gives
the shareholders the right of first purchase on a pro rata basis; i.e., a
right exercisable in proportion to their existing interests.79 The rule
of narrow construction of stock transfer restrictions, however, has led
to defeat of the parties' intent where the wording of the restriction
has been subject to doubt.80
75 On veto rights m the minority shareholders see O'Neal, Giving Shareholders Power
to Veto Corporate Decisions: Use of Special Charter and By-law Provisions, 18 LAw
& CoNTEm. PoB. 451 (1953).
76 LAT N, Con'oRATnoNs 424-31 (1959).
77 CoiRp. CODE § 1106 provides: "Unless the articles provide otherwise, the
board of directors may issue shares, option rights, or securities having conversion or
option rights, without first offering them to shareholders of any class."
78 Although again the majority nght be held to a fiduciary duty.
79 See Appendix for § 5 of the proposed statute.8 0 See, e.g., Carlson v. Ringgold County Mutual Telephone Co., 252 Iowa 478, 108
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Guaranty Laundry Co. v. Pulliam81 is illustrative of the-problem.
The stock transfer restriction was included in a shareholders' agree-
ment which provided that in the event one shareholder should con-
sider selling his shares, he would "'give the remaining stockholders
or stockholder, the first and last chance to purchase his stock."' 82 The
issue was whether a sale of all the shares to one shareholder satisfied
the terms of the agreement. Following the rule of narrow construction,
the court held that "we conclude that it may reasonably be construed
that the agreement was satisfied by sale to a remaining stock-
holder, as well as to all of the remaining stockholders."83
Because of the rule of narrow construction typified by the Pulliam
case and because it must be presumed that the draftsman's intent is
to maintain the original balance of power, a pro rata exercise of the
right of first purchase is the rule under section 5 of the proposed
statute, unless provided otherwise.
Section 15 of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act,84 which is intended
to be superseded by section 8-204 of the Uniform Commercial Code,85
requires a notation on the face of the stock certificate that the shares
are subject to transfer restrictions. The Uniform Commercial Code
changes the old rule m two respects: (1) a transferee with actual
knowledge of the restriction will be bound by it even in the absence of
notation on the shares and (2) the notation must be conspicuous.86
Section 6 of the proposed statute, which refers to the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, is intended merely as a reminder that these rules must
be compiled with.8 7
The proposed statute does not indicate any method by which the
price to be paid for the transfer of shares under a stock transfer re-
striction shall be determined. Fixing the value of shares of a close
corporation has been a continuing, thorny problem.8 8 The difficulty
N.W.2d 478 (1961); Sands Point Land Co. v. Rossmore, 43 Misc. 2d 368, 251 N.Y.S.2d
197 (Sup. Ct. 1964); Dorby v. Dorby, 262 P.2d 691 (Okla. 1953); Guaranty Laundry
Co. v. Puliam, 198 Okla. 667, 181 P.2d 1007 (1947). The Massachusetts decisions, how-
ever, take a contrary position: Boston Safe Dep. & Tr. Co. v. North Attleborough Chapter,
American Red Cross, 330 Mass. 114, 111 N.E.2d 447 (1953); Monotype Composition
Co. v. Kiernan, 319 Mass. 456, 66 N.E.2d 565 (1946).
81 198 Okla. 667, 181 P.2d 1007 (1947).
82 Id. at 670, 181 P.2d at 1009.
83Id. at 670, 181 P.2d at 1009.
84 UNoRM STocK TRANsTEa AcT § 15 reads: "[TIhere shall be no restriction upon
the transfer of shares unless the restriction is stated upon the certificate."
8S'TNIFoM CoMrMcIAL CODE § 8-204 reads: "Unless noted conspicuously on the
security a restriction on transfer imposed by the issuer even though otherwise lawful is
ineffective except against a person with actual knowledge of it."
86 Ibid.
87 If, for any reason, a state which adopts the Uniform Commercial Code elects
not to adopt § 8-204 and repeals the Uniform Stock Transfer Act, then § 6 of the
proposed statute would not have to be complied with.88 See Forster, Valuing a Business Interest for the Purposes of a Purchase and Sale
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arises because the shares of a close corporation are not traded in the
market and therefore their fair market value cannot be readily ascer-
tamed. As a result, various formulae have been devised to arrive at a
proper valuation; these include book value (either inclusive or ex-
clusive of good will), fixed price, par value, and appraisal.89 Un-
fortunately, none of these approaches has produced a satisfactory
result in all situations because each method has its shortcomngs 0
Although fixing the price of shares subject to stock transfer restric-
tions is most inportant in drafting effective restrictions, it was con-
sidered best to omit any reference to valuation in the proposed
statute. Instead of adhering to one particular valuation method pre-
scribed by the statute the draftsman will be free to choose the price
formula best suited to the particular situation.
CONCLUSION
As long as legislatures consider that it is not possible adequately
to define the close corporation, comprehensive closely-held corpora-
tion statutes will not be enacted. Yet present statutes do not suffici-
ently provide for the needs of the close corporation. The courts and
close corporation draftsmen have attempted to reach satisfactory
results under these adverse conditions. When the adoption or elimi-
nation of stock transfer restrictions at a date subsequent to organrza-
tion is in issue, the outcome is often speculative. The courts, in at-
tempting to reach desirable results, are free to choose from among
several available approaches. Usually, none of these is expressly
adapted to stock transfer restrictions in the close corporation, and
the results are exemplified in the vacillations of the Caifforma courts.
When interpretation of the language creating stock transfer restric-
tions is in issue, many courts feel bound to a rule of narrow con-
struction because of the policy against restraints on alienation.
The proposed statute is directed specifically at stock transfer
restrictions in the close corporation. It is intended as a basis for in-
termediate legislation-somewhere between comprehensive close cor-
poration statutes (which are not too likely to be enacted) and existing
statutes (which are not satisfactory). Such intermediate legislation
should alleviate some of the existing uncertainties regarding stock
transfer restrictions, which are essential elements to the success of
the close corporation.91
Agreement, 4 STAN. L. REv. 325 (1952); O'Neal, Restrictions on Transfer of Stock in
Closely Held Corporations: Planning and Drafting, 65 HARv. L. REv. 773, 797-807
(1952).
89 See authorities cited note 88 supra.
90 See authorities cited note 88 supra.
91 It should be stressed that the proposed statute is not intended to be all-inclusive.




§ 1. For purposes of this article dealing with stock transfer restrictions, as
set forth below, such restrictions, to be valid, must be found in the ar-
ticles of incorporation.
92
(a) For purposes of this article only, an amendment to the articles
of incorporation, as set forth in part (b) of this section, will be required
either to eliminate stock transfer restrictions found in the articles of in-
corporation as originally filed, or to include stock transfer restrictions at
some later date.
(b) The necessary vote to amend the articles of incorporation under
this article dealing with stock transfer restrictions, shall be by unanmous
vote of all voting shares in the case of a corporation with four or fewer
shareholders and a vote of two-thirds or more of the voting shares in a
corporation with five or more shareholders.
§ 2. Among the types of restrictions on the transfer of shares of stock sanc-
tioned by this article, which are intended to be illustrative and not ex-
clusive, are: rights of first purchase to buy in the corporation or the share-
holders or both in succession; rights of first purchase running to the benefit
of the corporation to purchase back a terminated employee's shares; and
rights of first purchase running to the benefit of the shareholders to pur-
chase shares held by the corporation and subsequently offered for sale.
§ 3. Unless the articles of incorporation provide otherwise, the right of first
purchase must be exercised or rejected within 45 days if the corporation
is an optionee or within 30 days if a shareholder is an optionee.
(a) The time period specified n this section shall commence upon the
receipt of written notice from the transferor.
(b) Where there are successive rights of first purchase, the second
period, if applicable, shall commence the day after the expiration of the
first period.
§ 4. Stock transfer restrictions adopted in accordance with this article
shall attach automatically to all shares of stock of the corporation, regard-
less of the time or manner of issuance, or by whom held, unless the restric-
tions are eliminated as provided in § 1(a) and (b).
§ 5. Unless the stock transfer restriction provides otherwise, a right of first
purchase in the shareholders is exercisable by the shareholders pro rata.
§ 6. Any restrictions on the right to transfer shares, as set forth in this
article, must comply with the provisions of § 8-204 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code.
93
function of the proposed statute is to serve as a basis for stimulation of legislative
activity.
92 Source: Painter, Stock Transfer Restrictions: Continuing Uncertainties and a
Legislative Proposal, 6 VmL. L. REv. 48, 67 (1960).
93 Tis section of the proposed statute would only be necessary if the Uniform
Stock Transfer Act or the Uniform Commercial Code is in force in the particular state.
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